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ELIMINATING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
IN THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET: 
PROPOSALS FOR FAIR LENDING REFORM 
By Winnie F. Taylor* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lending discrimination has been a national problem for 
decades. Before Congress enacted the Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act (ECOA) in 1974 to combat it, lenders routinely denied 
credit to potential borrowers because of their race, gender, age, 
marital status and other personal characteristics unrelated to 
creditworthiness standards.1 For instance, some creditors based 
their lending decisions on stereotypical assumptions about 
whether women in certain age groups would have children or 
return to work after childbirth.2 Others excluded minority 
communities from their lending areas by literally drawing red 
lines on maps around neighborhoods where mostly African 
Americans and Hispanics resided.3 The ECOA is a fair lending 
law that proscribes lending practices that impede credit 
opportunities for women, racial minorities and others who have 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  I am grateful to Bethany 
Walsh, Dylan Gordon, and Adrienne Valdez for their helpful research 
assistance.  I also thank the Brooklyn Law School faculty research fund for 
its support. 
1 See Winnie F. Taylor, Meeting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s 
Specificity Requirement: Judgmental and Statistical Scoring Systems, 29 
BUFF. L. REV. 73, 74–81 (1980). 
2 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDIT IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 151, 152–53 (1972). 
3 Gene A. Marsh, Lender Liability for Consumer Fraud Practices of 
Retail Dealers and Home Improvement Contractors, 45 ALA. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1993) (discussing historical origin of the term “redlining”). 
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historically experienced credit discrimination.  
Credit discrimination issues have emerged from the rise and 
fall of the subprime housing market. The problems stem from 
the race-based practices of overzealous subprime lenders in the 
selling of home loans. This discriminatory lending behavior is 
one of many factors that contributed to the market’s collapse. It 
is therefore imperative that policy makers concerned about 
preventing another crisis consider the impact that racial 
discrimination can have on igniting or exacerbating a mortgage 
lending disaster. Legal scholars and other commentators have 
highlighted the discriminatory underpinnings of the crisis,4 
noting in particular that some subprime lenders aggressively 
targeted minority neighborhoods for the purpose of making 
unaffordable home loans that were destined for delinquency, 
default, and foreclosure.5 Because of these and other abusive 
lending tactics, racial minorities received the lion’s share of 
subprime loans during the housing boom that preceded the 
crisis.6 After the bubble burst, massive foreclosures followed 
with a disproportionate share concentrated in minority 
communities. Consequently, these communities experienced the 
brunt of the devastation that resulted from the subprime 
                                                          
4 See Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, 
the Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164 (2009); Brian Gilmore 
et al., The Nightmare on Main Street for African-Americans: A Call for a 
New National Policy Focus on Homeownership, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. 
L. & POL’Y 262, 262–65 (2008) (discussing the impact of racial 
discrimination on the housing crisis). 
5 Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized 
Consumer Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL’Y __ (2009). 
6 DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF 
SUBPRIME MORTGAGES (2006), available at http://www.responsiblelending. 
org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/rr011-Unfair_Lending-0506.pdf; 
Christopher Mayer & Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and 
to Whom 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14083, 
2007) (discussing subprime loan originations in 2005 and concluding that 
subprime mortgages during this time period were concentrated in locations 
with high proportions of black and Hispanic residents). 
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“meltdown.”7   
Some creditors use unscrupulous marketing and underwriting 
practices that earn them the label “predatory lenders.”8 Among 
these lenders are “equal opportunity abusers,” that is, creditors 
who indiscriminately mistreat minority and non-minority 
borrowers. Others engage in race-based lending practices that 
are not only abusive but also illegal under the ECOA. For 
example, two loan originators employed by a major bank with a 
significant subprime department before the mortgage market 
collapsed, described in affidavits how the bank solicited African 
American customers and charged them more than necessary for 
mortgage loans because of their race.9 These former bank 
employees also reported how African American customers were 
                                                          
7 See Matthew Price, Baltimore’s Tale of Sub-prime Woe, BBC NEWS, 
June 28, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/8118376.stm 
(describing the devastation to the Baltimore community). 
8 The term “predatory lending” describes various onerous lending 
practices, which are often targeted at vulnerable populations. Predatory 
lending has been defined as a syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices 
that involve one or more of the following five problems: (1) loans structured 
to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (2) harmful 
rent-seeking; (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive practices; (4) other forms 
of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable as fraud; and (5) loans 
that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress. See Kathleen C. 
Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259–1261 (2002). 
9 See affidavit of Tony Paschal, an employee of Wells Fargo, describing 
practices where employees engaged in marketing specifically targeted at 
minorities, even going as far as printing out flyers in what they referred to as 
the “African American” language. Affidavit of Tony Paschal at ¶ 11, Mayor 
of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:08-cv-00062 (D. Md. June 3, 2009). 
Another employee described practices where Wells Fargo employees would 
push subprime loans onto minority customers who were eligible for the lower 
priced prime rates by deceptive practices ranging from convincing people it 
was the only way to get the paperwork finished quickly to offering a donation 
to the church of the customers’ choice. Affidavit of Elizabeth Jacobson at ¶ 
12, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:08-cv-00062 (D. Md. June 3, 
2009). This same employee testified that once she received a referral for a 
customer, she was only permitted to offer them a subprime loan, even if they 
were eligible for a prime loan. Id. at ¶ 3.  
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sometimes steered to subprime loans10 even though such 
customers qualified for less expensive prime loans.11 The ECOA 
specifically prohibits disparate treatment on the basis of race.12  
This Article proposes action the federal government should 
take to better protect minority consumers in the subprime market 
from discriminatory lending practices. First, more impact 
litigation is needed to encourage compliance with the ECOA and 
to generate sanctions for subprime creditors who violate fair 
lending laws. Second, current fair lending laws and regulations 
designed to ferret out creditors who discriminate on the basis of 
race need to be revised to better assist federal prosecutors in 
their litigation efforts. 
As explained more fully below, claims of racial 
discrimination in mortgage credit are not new; however, the 
context of the problem has changed. Initially, the primary 
concern was denial of home loans to residents of minority 
communities.13 Today, the dominant concern is excessive bad 
credit in these communities that is perversely tied to mortgage 
lenders who intentionally made improvident loans.14 As creditors 
become more creative in devising discriminatory practices, the 
                                                          
10 A “subprime loan” is a loan that features higher costs than a prime 
loan, both upfront and throughout the life of the loan. The defining 
characteristic of the subprime mortgage is the higher interest rate it carries 
over a prime loan. See Michael Aleo & Pablo Svirsky, Foreclosure Fallout: 
The Banking Industry’s Attack on Disparate Impact Race Discrimination 
Claims Under the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 18 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5 (2008) (discussing subprime loans). The higher 
rates are presumably to compensate lenders for the added risks associated 
with lending to borrowers with weaker credit histories. See ALLEN J. 
FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, SUBPRIME LOCATIONS: PATTERNS OF 
GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY IN SUBPRIME LENDING 1 (2006), available at 
www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/SubprimeLocationsStudy090506.pdf.  
11 Prime loans are loans with interest rates and fees that conventional 
banks charge their best customers.  See CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION ET 
AL, PAYING MORE FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM, A MULTI-STATE ANALYSIS 
OF HIGHER COST PURCHASE LENDING, app. (2007), available at 
http://www.calreinvest.org/system/assets/47.pdf. 
12 See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §1691 (2006). 
13 See supra note 3. 
14 See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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federal response should include enhancement of fair lending 
enforcement and stronger consumer protection laws.  
In exploring the proposals presented herein, the first part of 
this Article emphasizes the importance of government litigation 
as a means of combating lending discrimination in the subprime 
housing market. For almost two decades, ECOA enforcement 
authorities have litigated race-based mortgage lending claims. 
This section reviews that litigation and argues for more federal 
prosecution of subprime lenders that discriminate on the basis of 
race. 
The second part argues for regulatory reform. Specifically, 
this part proposes amending Regulation C,15 which implements 
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),16 by adding credit 
scores to the information subprime lenders must report to federal 
regulatory agencies regarding their home mortgage lending 
experience. Currently, certain lenders must collect and report 
demographic and pricing data that federal officials analyze to 
determine if discriminatory lending patterns exist that violate fair 
lending laws. Including credit score data in the analysis would 
enhance the ability of these officials to make this determination. 
As explained in greater detail in Part II below, adding credit 
risk information to the HMDA reporting requirements might 
cause some lenders to make fewer subprime loans, especially 
those concerned about greater exposure to lawsuits and more 
regulatory scrutiny. However, if subprime lenders cut back 
significantly in making mortgage loans, credit-impaired 
borrowers, who are their primary customers, will be further 
limited in home financing options.17 To address this concern, I 
                                                          
15 12 C.F.R. § 203 (2009).  
16 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810 (2006). 
17 The subprime lender specializes in issuing high-interest mortgages to 
families with few credit options. See Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of 
Race: When Making It to the Middle Is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1777, 1792–94 (2004) (discussing the history of subprime lending). 
Most subprime refinance borrowers use the collateral in their homes for debt 
consolidation and other consumer credit purposes. See FISHBEIN & 
WOODALL, supra note 10, at 1 (discussing subprime borrowers who refinance 
home loans). 
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argue that the federal government should provide funds to credit 
unions for the purpose of increasing their subprime lending. 
This public funding proposal is attractive for several reasons. 
First, if some subprime lenders reduce mortgage credit because 
the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) adds credit scores to their 
HMDA reporting requirements, credit unions may be able to fill 
the void by expanding their subprime lending to more qualified, 
higher-risk borrowers in under-served communities. Given their 
non-profit, quasi-governmental status, credit unions are unlikely 
to reduce subprime mortgage lending because of a new credit 
score reporting requirement.18 Second, expanding the credit 
union subprime market would provide potential borrowers with 
viable alternatives to abusive home mortgage providers. Third, 
such expansion would provide competition to predatory 
subprime lenders.  
By focusing on remedies and strategies for combating the 
racial discrimination problem in subprime lending, this Article 
brings issues of race and ethnicity to the forefront of the 
mortgage crisis where they belong. Developing effective 
responses to prevent its reoccurrence demands consideration of 
all factors that led to the market’s demise, especially those 
indicative of unlawful conduct.  
I. IMPACT LITIGATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Congress gave ECOA enforcement authority to the FRB, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), and a number of other federal agencies.19 Claims of 
                                                          
18 See Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curbing Predatory Lending, 122 
BANKING L.J. 483 (2005); see also infra text accompanying note 107. 
19 Enforcement authority under the ECOA is divided between federal 
agencies. The U.S Department of Justice may initiate a lawsuit under the 
ECOA where it believes a creditor has engaged in a pattern or practice of 
discrimination. With respect to claims against national banks, and Federal 
branches, enforcement authority is with the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC); for claims against member banks of the Federal Reserve 
System (other than national banks), and commercial lending companies 
owned or controlled by foreign banks, enforcement authority is with the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; for claims against banks 
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racial discrimination in the subprime mortgage market present 
the latest regulatory challenge to these authorities. In addition to 
investigating and examining creditors for fair lending 
compliance, government agencies should use litigation 
vigorously to address discrimination claims. Their sustained 
litigation efforts will likely encourage fair lending compliance by 
sending a clear message to the lending industry that ECOA 
violators will be relentlessly pursued, prosecuted, and held 
accountable for engaging in unlawful conduct.  
The DOJ and the FTC already have experience litigating 
ECOA claims similar to many of those that have emerged from 
the mortgage crisis, including those involving discriminatory 
pricing. Some of their groundbreaking cases are summarized in 
the next section. All of the cases were settled. Nevertheless, 
these cases helped establish novel lending discrimination 
theories20 and demonstrate that litigation can be an effective 
means of combating racial discrimination in mortgage lending. 
To achieve this end, litigation efforts must be relentless. 
A. Redlining  
At the federal level, efforts to eliminate home mortgage 
discrimination have been ongoing for almost two decades. In 
1992, the DOJ filed its first ECOA mortgage-lending lawsuit 
against a Georgia bank. The complaint charged the bank with 
“redlining,” that is, refusing to make loans in certain 
geographical areas because of the racial composition of its 
residents.21 Specifically, DOJ attorneys alleged that Decatur 
Federal Savings & Loan “devised ways to avoid dealing with 
                                                          
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of 
the Federal Reserve System) and insured State branches of foreign banks, 
enforcement authority is with the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation; for claims against credit unions enforcement authority 
resides with the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration. 
See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2006). 
20 See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE CREDIT AND SALES 
LEGAL PRACTICE SERIES § 12.4.1 (4th ed. 2005). 
21 See supra note 3. 
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African Americans in the Atlanta area and avoided making 
mortgage loans in black communities.”22 To support the claim 
that Decatur Federal intentionally denied banking services to 
African Americans, the complaint further alleged that none of 
the bank’s 48 branch offices were located in predominately 
African American neighborhoods.23 The consent decree that 
settled the case required the bank to pay $1 million to 
compensate 48 rejected credit applicants and to take a series of 
corrective measures to ensure compliance with the ECOA, 
including opening up a branch office in a predominately black 
neighborhood.24 
Since 1992, the DOJ has filed and settled a myriad of 
redlining lawsuits against banks and other financial institutions. 
In one such case involving a bank in the District of Columbia, 
DOJ attorneys alleged that Chevy Chase Bank refused to market 
mortgage loans in predominately African American communities 
in Washington, D.C., because of the racial identity of those 
neighborhoods.25 As it did in Decatur, the DOJ’s litigation 
strategy included focusing on the location of bank branch offices 
to support its contention that the bank intentionally excluded 
blacks from receiving its mortgage lending services. 
Accordingly, the complaint alleged that 70 of the 74 Chevy 
Chase branch offices were located in predominately white 
communities.26 The settlement agreement required the bank to 
pay $11 million to establish a special loan program so that 
mortgage-lending services could be provided to the neglected 
areas. The agreement also required the bank to open up branch 
offices in minority neighborhoods.27 
Similarly, the DOJ sued Albank for redlining in violation of 
                                                          
22 Complaint at ¶¶ 8–16, United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc., No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. 1992). 
23 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 9. 
24 Consent Decree at ¶¶ 2–48, Decatur, No. 92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. 
1992). 
25 Complaint at ¶ 12, United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 
94-CV-01829 (D.D.C. 1994). 
26 Id. at ¶ 13.  
27 Consent Decree, Chevy Chase, No. 94-CV-01829. 
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the ECOA. In this 1997 case, DOJ attorneys contended that the 
bank refused to take mortgage loan applications from areas in 
Connecticut and Westchester County, New York, with 
significant minority populations. Further, the government 
attorneys claimed that the bank could provide no reason for 
carving out minority communities from its lending areas.28 The 
consent decree that ended this litigation required the bank to 
provide $55 million in loans at below market rates to the 
communities that it refused to service previously and to 
implement a non-discriminatory lending policy.29 
More recently, the DOJ prosecuted two mid-western banks 
for redlining. In 2004, the agency resolved a lawsuit it filed 
against First American Bank. The DOJ attorneys claimed that 
the bank unlawfully failed to market its mortgage credit and 
other lending products to predominately minority neighborhoods 
in the Chicago and Kankakee, Illinois, metropolitan areas.30 
Additionally, the prosecutors alleged that of the nearly $288 
million in single family residential real estate loans that the bank 
funded between 1999 and 2001, only 4.5% went to properties 
located in minority census tracts.31 The terms of the consent 
order required First American to open four new full-service 
branch offices, three of which had to be located in majority 
African American census tracts in the Chicago area and one in a 
majority Hispanic census tract. Further, it required the bank to 
invest $5 million in a special financing program for residents 
and businesses in the minority communities of the 
Chicago/Kankakee areas.32 
In 2006, DOJ attorneys filed the other mid-western bank 
case and subsequently resolved redlining allegations against 
                                                          
28 Complaint at ¶ 14, United States v. Albank, FSB, No. 97-CV-1206 
(N.D.N.Y 1997). 
29 Consent Decree at § III(1), Albank, No. 97-CV-1206. 
30 Id. (consent decree). Complaint at ¶¶ 17–21, United States v. First 
Am. Bank, No. 04-CV-4585 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2004) [hereinafter First 
American Consent Decree]. The DOJ’s complaint alleged that all but four of 
the bank’s 34 branches were located in a minority area. Id. at ¶ 15. 
31 Id. at ¶ 28.  
32 First American Consent Decree, supra note 30, at § III. 
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Centier Bank in Indiana. At the time of the litigation, Centier 
Bank was one of the largest residential lenders in the Gary, 
Indiana, metropolitan area.33 The complaint alleged that the bank 
avoided serving the mortgage credit needs of neighborhoods 
where the majority of the residents are African American or 
Hispanic, especially in the cities of Gary, East Chicago, and 
Hammond.34 The settlement agreement that ended this lawsuit 
required the bank to open or acquire at least two full service 
offices within designated African American and Hispanic areas. 
It also required the bank to provide the same services offered at 
its majority white suburban locations to all branches regardless 
of their location. Further, the bank had to invest a minimum of 
$3.5 million in special financing programs for residential and 
small business loans.35  
The above redlining cases highlight the historical lack of 
conventional mortgage lending sources in minority communities 
and the efforts of government attorneys to remove racial barriers 
to minority homeownership and residential refinancing. They 
also demonstrate how racial discrimination can create a dual 
system of mortgage lending that can lock minority borrowers out 
of lower-cost mortgage credit that conventional lenders typically 
provide. When these lenders refuse to lend in minority 
neighborhoods, a void is created that abusive lenders fill by 
charging excessive rates and imposing other unfavorable loan 
terms. Thus, conventional lenders can play a significant role in 
making minority borrowers especially vulnerable to predatory 
subprime lenders. To prevent such exploitation, ECOA 
enforcement authorities must remain vigilant in combating 
redlining. 
B. Reverse Redlining 
In contrast to redlining, the claims of racial discrimination in 
                                                          
33 Complaint at ¶¶ 3–6, United States v. Centier Bank, No. 06-CV-344 
(N.D. Ind. Oct. 13, 2006).  
34 Id. at ¶ 10. 
35 Consent Order at ¶ 23, Centier Bank, No. 06-CV-344. 
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mortgage lending that emerged from the subprime crisis focus 
on an abundance of mortgage credit in minority neighborhoods; 
however, this credit has been notoriously burdensome. These 
“reverse redlining”36 complaints allege that some predatory 
subprime lenders target minority neighborhoods for the purpose 
of making mortgage loans that are saddled with unfavorable 
terms, especially price inequities. Although federal prosecutors 
began litigating reverse redlining claims more than a decade 
before the subprime crisis, the foreclosure epidemic that has 
caused devastation to many minority neighborhoods37 is likely to 
precipitate a notable increase in the filing of these cases. 
Importantly, the government’s reverse redlining cases have 
created a template that private litigants can use to structure 
arguments for proving disparate impact38 and disparate 
treatment39 lending discrimination claims.  
                                                          
36 “Reverse redlining” is the practice of extending credit on unfair terms 
to specific geographic areas due to the income, race or ethnicity of its 
residents. Assoc. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (citations omitted). 
37 See Fisher, supra note 5. 
38 Disparate impact discrimination occurs when creditors use neutral 
policies or practices that have a disproportionate adverse affect on persons in 
the ECOA protected classes. This framework for proving lending 
discrimination has a burden-shifting approach. The first step under this 
approach requires the plaintiff to prove that a creditor practice or policy 
created a disparity on an ECOA prohibited basis. If the plaintiff establishes 
this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the creditor to prove that the policy 
is justified by a business necessity. At the final stage, the plaintiff prevails if 
there is sufficient evidence that an alternative policy or practice could serve 
the creditor’s same business purpose with less discriminatory effect. See 
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper 
Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (discussing the approach in the 
context of employment discrimination); see also infra notes 70–74 and 
accompanying text. 
39 Disparate treatment discrimination occurs when creditors treat some 
borrowers or potential borrowers less favorably than others because of ECOA 
protected class characteristics such as race or sex. Under this theory, proof of 
the lender’s discriminatory intent is crucial. In employment law, burden-
shifting approach is used to prove disparate treatment cases. See McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–806 (1973). 
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In 1996, the DOJ brought a reverse redlining lawsuit against 
Long Beach Mortgage Company challenging its mortgage 
pricing policies. Long Beach is a subprime mortgage affiliate of 
Washington Mutual Savings Association.40 The complaint alleged 
that the mortgage company directed its marketing efforts 
primarily toward persons and neighborhoods of color that 
lending officials believed might be susceptible to higher prices.41 
Also, DOJ attorneys contended that the mortgage company’s 
loan originators typically emphasized low monthly payment 
amounts when discussing loan prices with minority borrowers 
rather than interest rates, points, and annual percentages rates.42 
Further, the complaint asserted that Long Beach allowed both its 
employee loan officers and its independent loan brokers the 
discretion to charge subprime mortgage borrowers a commission 
of up to 12% above the lender’s base price for the loan 
amount.43 The DOJ attorneys contended that this discretionary 
pricing policy resulted in disparate treatment of minorities and 
other borrowers protected under the ECOA. In particular, the 
DOJ alleged that African American females over the age of 55 
were 2.6 times more likely than white males under the age of 56 
to be charged fees and points under Long Beach’s lending 
policies.44 
In the mortgage lending industry, pricing disparities often 
arise from “overages,” that is, discretionary authority of 
employees or brokers who originate loans to charge higher rates 
than the lender’s set rate.45 Because they usually receive 
                                                          
40 Some major banks engage in subprime mortgage lending through 
subsidiary companies. For instance, NationsCredit and EquiCredit are Bank 
of America’s subprime affiliates and Citigroup is Citibank’s subprime lending 
subsidiary. 
41 Complaint at ¶ 18, United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., No. 
96 Civ. 6159 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Long Beach Complaint]. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at ¶ 15. 
44 Id. at ¶ 19. 
45 “Overage” or “yield spread,” refers to the practice of allowing loan 
personnel to charge customers a higher interest rate than the lender’s base or 
minimum rate. As an incentive for bringing in loans at a higher rate, lenders 
frequently share the overage with the loan originator. See NATIONAL 
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additional compensation when borrowers agree to pay prices 
above the lender’s set rate, loan originators have an incentive to 
make loans at the highest rate possible. In Long Beach, the 
government claimed that the discretionary pricing policy resulted 
in disparate treatment of minorities and other borrowers 
protected under the ECOA.46 Moreover, the DOJ claimed that 
the mortgage company was liable not only for the discriminatory 
pricing of its loan officers but also for that of the independent 
brokers. The DOJ concluded that the lender should be liable for 
the brokers’ conduct because the mortgage company was 
ultimately responsible for underwriting the loans and hiring the 
brokers.47  In settlement, Long Beach agreed to pay $3 million 
to 1,200 borrowers and to spend $1 million on educational 
programs.48 
In 1996, the DOJ again confronted the issue of 
discriminatory pricing in a reverse redlining case when it 
prosecuted two mortgage companies. The complaints alleged that 
loan officers at Fleet Mortgage Company in Brooklyn, New 
York, and Huntington Mortgage Company in Cleveland, Ohio, 
charged African American and Hispanic borrowers higher up-
front fees for mortgages than they charged similarly situated 
white borrowers.49 Further, the complaint alleged that the higher 
                                                          
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, THE CREDIT AND SALES LEGAL PRACTICES SERIES 
§ 12.4.3.9 (3d ed. 2002). 
46 Long Beach Complaint, supra note 41, at ¶ 24.  
47 Settlement Agreement, United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., 
No. 96-CV-6159 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Long Beach 
Settlement]. Also, the role that independent mortgage brokers played in the 
subprime crisis is being scrutinized with an eye toward regulation and 
oversight. It is the alleged abusive conduct of brokers that has led to many 
proposals for regulatory reform in the subprime mortgage market. See Alan 
M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
617 (2008); Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Sometimes Less is More: Utility, 
Preemption, and Hermeneutical Criticisms of Proposed Federal Regulation of 
Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV. 61 (2007). 
48 Long Beach Settlement, supra note 47.  
49 Complaint at ¶ 9, United States v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., No. 96-CV-
2279 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1996) [hereinafter Fleet Complaint]; Complaint at ¶ 
9, 12, 14, United States v. Huntington Mortgage Co., No. 95-CV-2211 
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prices, which resulted from a compensation incentive program 
similar to the one in Long Beach, could not have occurred by 
chance and were unrelated to the qualifications of the minority 
borrowers or the risk to the lender.50 The DOJ attorneys did not 
challenge the legality of the employee/broker incentive program. 
Instead, they claimed that the two mortgage companies illegally 
used the program to extract higher prices from minorities 
because of their race.51 Private litigants have followed the lead 
of DOJ attorneys in making ECOA price discrimination claims 
against subprime lenders with broker/employee incentive 
programs like that in Long Beach.52  
In another high-impact, reverse-redlining lawsuit, three 
government agencies jointly prosecuted a major subprime 
lender. The three agencies—the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern 
District of New York (DOJ), the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), and the FTC—filed a reverse 
redlining lawsuit against Delta Funding Corporation. At the time 
of this litigation, most of Delta’s business was concentrated in 
the minority residential areas of Brooklyn and Queens, New 
York.53 Among other allegations, the government claimed that 
Delta violated the ECOA by granting loans with higher broker 
fees to African American women than those of similarly situated 
white men, by allowing unreasonable broker fees, by engaging 
in asset-based lending, by paying kickbacks to brokers to induce 
them to refer loan applicants to Delta, and by approving loans 
without regard for the borrower’s ability to repay.54 Further, the 
complaint alleged that Delta targeted minority neighborhoods 
                                                          
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Huntington Complaint].  
50 Fleet Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 10; Huntington Complaint, supra 
note 49, at ¶¶ 12–14.  
51 See Fleet Complaint, supra note 49, at ¶ 11; Huntington Complaint, 
supra note 49, at ¶ 15. 
52 See Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 253 (D. 
Mass. 2008); Garcia v. Country Wide Fin. Corp., No. 07-CV-1161, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106675, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2008). 
53 Complaint at ¶ 8, United States v. Delta Funding Corp., No. 00-CV-
01872 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
54 Id. at ¶¶ 12, 14–15, 17–19. 
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with abusive practices, thereby placing borrowers thousands of 
dollars in debt and exposing them to unwarranted risk of default 
and foreclosure.55 The complaint described a number of Delta’s 
victims as African American widows living in Brooklyn who 
had little or no outstanding debt before refinancing their 
mortgages at prices they could not afford.56 The settlement 
agreement that ended the case required Delta to provide 
monetary relief of up to $12 million to victims of its lending 
practices.57  
In 2008, the FTC filed an ECOA action individually against 
Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Services Corporation 
and its general partner, Gateway Funding.58 Among the FTC’s 
allegations was the claim that Gateway used discriminatory 
pricing practices in both prime and subprime mortgage loans 
that resulted in African American and Hispanic customers being 
charged higher interest rates and up-front fees than white 
customers.59 The settlement required Gateway to pay $2.9 
million, however, all but $200,000 was suspended because of 
Gateway’s inability to pay.60 
C. Establishing ECOA Precedents 
Private litigants have also filed reverse redlining lawsuits 
against subprime lenders with allegations similar to those in the 
above government cases.61 As these cases work their way up 
                                                          
55 Id. at ¶ 17.  
56 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Delta Funding Corporation Settles 
U.S. Charges for Fair Lending and Consumer Law (Mar. 30, 2000), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2000/March/154cr.htm. 
57 Settlement Agreement at § 5, Delta, No. 00-CV-01872. 
58 Complaint, FTC v. Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Servs., 
L.P., No. 08-CV-5805 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2008). 
59 Id. at ¶ 18. 
60 Final Judgment at § VI(A), Gateway, No. 08-CV-5805.  
61 See, e.g., NAACP v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 07-CV-0794 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) (order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
The NAACP alleged disparate impact and disparate treatment discrimination 
in violation of ECOA.  
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through the courts, they may establish much needed precedent 
on the legal issues surrounding the targeting of minority 
neighborhoods. Precedential value could also come if 
government reverse redlining lawsuits lead to full-fledged 
litigation instead of settlement. Although the advantages of 
settlement (e.g., lower cost, certainty of outcome, 
expeditiousness) are important, it would also be tremendously 
beneficial for courts to decide whether the government’s 
redlining and reverse redlining claims are meritorious. 
Established precedent can reveal gaps in the current laws and 
provide guidance regarding appropriate ways to fill them, such 
as whether new legislation is needed to further federal fair 
lending policy objectives.  
There are additional advantages to having judicial opinions in 
reverse redlining cases. For instance, victims likely receive a 
psychological benefit when courts find lenders liable for 
discrimination. This benefit is absent when cases are settled 
because settlement agreements contain no admission to or 
finding of illegal conduct. Also, it would be helpful to know 
how courts would impose damages against subprime lenders 
found liable for targeting minority neighborhoods and engaging 
in discriminatory pricing practices in violation of the ECOA. 
The settlement agreements mentioned above require lenders to 
pay millions of dollars to compensate consumers and establish 
funding for various programs.62 These amounts seem to reflect 
both actual and punitive damages. However, if ECOA claims 
are fully litigated and lenders are subsequently found liable for 
discrimination, it is unclear whether courts could award similar 
damages. 
Currently, ECOA violators are subject to civil liability for 
actual and punitive damages in individual and class actions. 
Liability for punitive damages is limited to $10,000 in individual 
actions and the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the 
creditor’s net worth in class actions.63 In determining the amount 
of punitive damages, the Act requires courts to consider, among 
                                                          
62 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 48, 57, and 60.  
63 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (2006).  
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other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages 
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance 
by the creditor, the resources of the creditor, the number of 
persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the creditor’s 
failure of compliance was intentional.64 Although courts may 
find that millions of dollars in punitive damages should be 
imposed against lenders in some reverse redlining cases, it is 
unclear whether the $500,000 statutory ceiling will preclude 
such awards in actions brought by federal prosecutors. In private 
lawsuits, the ECOA specifically caps punitive damages at 
$500,000. The statute is silent, however, on whether the cap 
applies when administrative agencies successfully sue lenders. 
The ECOA’s statutory language merely states that the agencies 
may recover “relief as may be appropriate,” including actual 
and punitive damages.65  
The Federal Reserve Board, which implements the ECOA 
through Regulation B,66 should clarify whether punitive damages 
in administrative agency actions can exceed $500,000. If the cap 
does apply, Congress should amend the ECOA to increase it or 
allow judges to decide each case without a cap. The $500,000 
ceiling on punitive damages is insufficient to punish subprime 
lenders who egregiously fail to comply with the ECOA by 
targeting minority neighborhoods for unaffordable loans that are 
likely to lead to foreclosure. Also, this amount is inadequate to 
deter other subprime lenders from devastating minority 
communities by engaging in reverse redlining lending practices. 
To determine an appropriate amount, consideration should be 
given to a lender’s net assets. For instance, Bank of America’s 
profits in the first quarter of 2009 were $2.4 billion67 and Wells 
Fargo had a 50% surge in net income during the same period, 
exceeding more than a billion dollars.68 Also, during the second 
                                                          
64 Id.  
65 Id. at § 1691e(h).  
66 12 C.F.R. § 202 (2003).  
67 Dan Fitzpatrick, For B of A, a $4.2 Billion Profit Isn’t a Fix, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at C1.  
68 Matthias Rieker & Damian Paletta, Banks Get Boost from Wells 
Fargo, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2009, at C1. 
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quarter of 2009, the profits for JP Morgan/Chase Bank were 
$2.7 billion.69 With quarterly profits like these, a $500,000 
penalty for an ECOA violation is grossly inadequate as a 
punishment or a deterrent. 
D. Litigation Challenges In Pursuing Reverse  
Redlining Cases 
Government attorneys who litigate reverse redlining claims 
on the merits may have difficulty proving some of their 
allegations in court. For instance, claims that certain subprime 
lending practices adversely impact people and communities of 
color present litigation challenges. The primary challenge stems 
from the uncertainty about whether ECOA plaintiffs can use the 
disparate impact theory to prove their lending discrimination 
claims. As mentioned previously, disparate impact 
discrimination occurs when a lender applies a neutral practice 
equally to credit applicants but the practice has a 
disproportionate adverse effect on applicants from the ECOA 
protected groups.70 To prove such claims, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that there is a significant disparity in outcomes 
between minorities and similarly situated non-minorities.71  
Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided that the 
disparate impact analytical framework is appropriate to use when 
proving age discrimination cases.72 However, the Court has not 
decided whether impact analysis can be used to prove lending 
discrimination claims. Although most federal courts allow 
ECOA plaintiffs to use statistical impact proof methods,73  
                                                          
69 Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan Posts $2.7 Billion in Profit, WALL ST. J., 
July 17, 2009, at C1. 
70 See Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
71 See supra note 38.  
72 See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 239–240 (2005).  
73 See, e.g., Smith v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. 00-CV-6003, 2003 WL 
328719 (D.N.J. 2003) (deciding that the ECOA permits disparate impact 
theory); Coleman v. General Motor Acceptance Corp., 196 F.R.D. 315 
(M.D. Tenn. 2000); Osborne v. Bank of Am., Nat’l Assoc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 
804 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). Cf. Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F. 3d 
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commentators strongly debate whether the Supreme Court would 
reverse those decisions if given the opportunity.74 Fully litigated 
reverse redlining lawsuits that use impact proof methods could 
present the Court with such an opportunity. 
E. Summary 
Vigilance in protecting homeowners from lending 
discrimination not only fosters a fair lending compliance 
environment, it also promotes public trust. It is therefore 
especially important for the federal government to prosecute 
egregious violators of the ECOA. Subprime lenders that cause 
devastation to individuals because of their race, and communities 
because of their racial composition, should know that 
government attorneys will sue them. Such impact litigation will 
signal to the public and the credit industry that eliminating racial 
discrimination in mortgage lending is a national priority. 
II: LEGISLATIVE REFORM: INCREASED ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 
AND HMDA AMENDMENT 
A. Reporting Credit Score Information  
Congress enacted HMDA in 1975 due to its concern that 
disproportionate home ownership among various racial groups 
might stem from biased lending practices or other discriminatory 
conduct in the mortgage industry.75 To address this concern, 
                                                          
712 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting ECOA disparate impact claim). 
74 See, e.g., Peter N. Cubita & Michelle Hartmann, The ECOA 
Discrimination Proscription and Disparate Impact—Interpreting the Meaning 
of the Words That Actually Are There, 61 BUS. LAW. 829 (2006). 
75 The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) was enacted by 
Congress in 1975 and is implemented by the Federal Reserve Board’s 
Regulation C. This regulation provides the public loan data that can be used 
to assist in determining whether financial institutions are serving the housing 
needs of their communities; assisting public officials in distributing public-
sector investments so as to attract private investment to areas where it is 
needed, and in identifying possible discriminatory lending patterns. See 
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, 9.1, 
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HMDA requires creditors to collect and report basic attributes of 
the mortgage applications they receive in metropolitan statistical 
areas.76 Under Regulation C, which the Federal Reserve Board 
wrote to implement HMDA, lenders must disclose to federal 
regulatory agencies and the general public, information 
regarding the race, ethnicity, sex, and income of mortgage 
applicants and borrowers.77 In addition to demographic 
information, Regulation C requires lenders to report certain 
pricing information.78 Federal officials analyze the HMDA data 
to see if they identify mortgage lenders with racial or ethnic 
lending patterns that indicate discrimination in violation of the 
ECOA or other fair lending laws. 
Initially, the FRB did not require lenders to report pricing 
information with other HMDA data. The FRB amended 
Regulation C in 2002 to add this information because it wanted 
insight into the possible connection between the cost of mortgage 
loans and the borrower’s race.79 The pricing information, 
coupled with HMDA demographic data, informs the FRB of not 
only who receives mortgage credit, but also who pays the most 
for it. Pursuant to the loan-pricing reporting requirement, 
lenders must now report information on “higher-cost” loans. 
Although both prime and subprime lenders must report the 
pricing data, this requirement primarily affects subprime lenders 
since most high-cost loans are made in the subprime market.80 
                                                          
9.2 (2006). 
76 12 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1) (2006). The HMDA requires lenders to use 
census tracts to capture these data.  
77 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)(10), (b)(1) (2009).  
78 Id. at § 203.4(a)(12)(i).  
79 Edward M. Gramlich, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks to the 
National Association of Real Estate Editors (June 3, 2005).  
80 Beginning with 2004 data, lenders are now required to compare the 
annual percentage rate (APR) on each loan made to the current interest rate 
on U.S. Treasury securities of the same maturity. If the difference (“spread”) 
between the loan’s APR and the interest rate on the Treasury securities is 
three percentage points or more (for a first-lien loan), then the spread for that 
loan must be reported in the lender’s HMDA data.” CAL. REINVESTMENT 
COALITION ET AL., supra note 11, app. In the lending industry, such loans 
are referred to as “higher-cost loans” or “higher-priced loans.” Id. Many 
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By all accounts, the addition of pricing information to the 
HMDA reporting requirements has been a tremendous benefit to 
ECOA enforcement officials. In recent reports to Congress, the 
agencies have emphasized the importance of this information to 
their fair lending enforcement efforts, noting in particular how 
invaluable it has been in helping to identify lenders that may be 
engaging in race-based lending practices.81 
However, the HMDA data do not include all variables 
lenders use to set loan prices, such as loan-to value ratios, debt-
to-income ratios, or credit scores.82 Given this under-
inclusiveness, the HMDA data are insufficient to determine 
whether a lender has actually violated the ECOA’s anti-
discrimination requirements. Thus, instead of proving 
discrimination, the data serve as a screening device to identify 
which lenders should be investigated and further scrutinized for 
                                                          
people use the terms “subprime loans” and “higher-cost” loans 
interchangeably, although there are many subprime loans (subprime because 
their interest rates and/or fees are greater than those of prime loans) with 
APRs that are below the HMDA-reporting threshold used to identify “higher-
cost” loans. Id.  
81 See, e.g., GRACE CHUNG BECKER, U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO 
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976 6 (2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt//housing/documents/ecoa2007.pdf; 
LORETTA KING, U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 2008 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EQUAL CREDIT 
OPPORTUNITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1976 6 (2009), available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/ecoa_report_2008.pdf; Rooting Out 
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending: Using HMDA as a Tool for Fair 
Lending Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 38, 42, 
(2007) (statements of Sandra L. Thompson, Director of the Division of 
Supervision and Consumer Protection, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
and Calvin R. Hagins, Director of Compliance Policy, Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency) [hereinafter Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing]. 
82 See Robert B. Avery et al., New Information Reported Under HMDA 
and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 FED. RES. BULL. 344, 
385–87 (2005) [hereinafter Avery, New Information]. A credit score is a 
mechanically determined credit rating that signifies whether an applicant is 
creditworthy based on key attributes of the applicant and aspects of the credit 
transaction. See Taylor, supra note 1, at 88. 
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possible discriminatory conduct.83 In short, HMDA data provide 
a list of suspects. But the omission of all credit risk criteria from 
HMDA analyses hinders the data’s effectiveness, even as a 
screening tool. Lenders can capitalize on this shortcoming. For 
instance, if HMDA data show significant price disparities along 
racial lines, the subprime lending industry can point out that the 
findings are misleading because legitimate credit risk factors that 
are omitted from the analysis could possibly justify the result. 
More specifically, lenders can say that credit scores, rather than 
race or ethnicity, are the cause of the racial disparities.  
Undoubtedly, credit risk factors can justify racial disparities 
in the HMDA data of some mortgage lenders and can help to 
identify others whose disparities result from discriminatory 
lending practices. Despite this benefit, there are no credit risk 
data in the HMDA analysis. The absence of such data makes it 
more difficult to determine which lenders are engaging in illegal 
conduct, since racial disparities, standing alone, do not prove 
discrimination. Because credit scores may easily explain the 
disparities, this credit risk information ought to be included in 
the HMDA data. The addition of credit score data would permit 
more nuanced analyses that would reveal more about whether 
race, credit risk or something else drives the observed 
differences in the price that people of color pay for mortgage 
loans.84  
Because credit history information will result in an analysis 
of HMDA data that is more indicative of where fair lending 
violations are likely to be found, the FRB should require the 
reporting of credit scores, at least for subprime lenders. More 
stringent scrutiny of this sector of the home mortgage market is 
needed because of the serious questions that have emerged 
regarding the link between the mortgage crisis and 
discriminatory pricing methods of predatory subprime lenders.85 
                                                          
83 Avery et al., supra note 82, at 387. 
84 Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy, HMDA Reporting of Credit Scores, 
CREDIT SLIPS, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2006/12/ 
hmda_reporting_.html. 
85 See generally Melissa LaVenia, Note, Predatory Lending’s Role in the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 101 (2008) 
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Allegations that these lenders targeted minority neighborhoods 
and intentionally made numerous unaffordable mortgage loans to 
their residents are among the frequently cited abuses.86 There is 
public concern that these and other discriminatory lending 
practices played a significant role in the foreclosure catastrophe 
that devastated minority neighborhoods after the subprime 
market collapsed.87 Moreover, for the fifth consecutive year 
since lenders began reporting pricing information to federal 
regulators, the HMDA data have indicated that a higher 
percentage of black and Hispanic borrowers have received high-
cost home loans than have white borrowers.88 These troubling 
outcomes reinforce the need for greater scrutiny of the subprime 
market. 
By amending Regulation C to require subprime lenders to 
report credit score information, the FRB and other fair lending 
enforcement agencies can identify potential ECOA violators 
more accurately and therefore use their resources more 
efficiently to investigate subprime creditors for discriminatory 
lending practices. With a sharper tool to assist in identifying 
creditors who may be over-charging minorities for home loans, 
federal agencies will be able to make subprime lenders more 
accountable for their lending decisions. Banking regulators are 
apparently aware that credit score data can enhance their fair 
lending enforcement efforts. During the 2007 Congressional 
hearings on discrimination in mortgage credit, a representative 
from the OCC stated that the members of the Federal Financial 
                                                          
(analyzing the relationship between predatory lending and foreclosures of 
subprime mortgages). 
86 See, e.g., Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing, supra note 81, at 106–
11.  
87 See Fisher, supra note 5.  
88 See New Information, supra note 82, at 376–82; Robert Avery et al., 
Higher Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, 92 FED. RES. 
BULL. 123, 158–165 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 HMDA Data]; Robert B. 
Avery et al., The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. 73, 94–97 (2007) 
[hereinafter 2006 HMDA Data]; Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007 HMDA 
Data, 94 FED. RES. BULL. 107, 135–39 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 HMDA 
Data].  
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Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)89 intended to jointly 
purchase “an external database of credit scores” to help in the 
general assessment of fair lending risks.90 Whether the agencies 
actually purchased the database and precisely how they are using 
it if they did, is unknown. What seems clear is that ECOA 
enforcement authorities recognize that credit scores can assist 
their efforts to combat discrimination in the subprime mortgage 
market. Thus, the FRB ought to  require subprime lenders to 
report credit scores in addition to their current HMDA data 
reporting requirements. 
B. Costs and Benefits 
Before imposing an additional reporting requirement on 
subprime lenders, the FRB must weigh the costs and benefits of 
doing so. On the positive side, the credit risk information would 
permit federal regulatory agencies to focus their investigations 
more efficiently when investigating lenders suspected of mixing 
race and risk in violation of the ECOA.91 This information may 
benefit some subprime lenders as well, since the analyzed credit 
score data could partially explain some racial disparities in 
pricing. Although these explanations would not be conclusive, 
they could make some lending patterns with racial disparities 
look less suspicious.92 
                                                          
89 Federal banking examiners that comprise the FFIEC are the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the National Credit Union Administration, 
the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
the Office of Thrift Supervision. About the FFIEC, http://www.ffiec.gov/ 
about.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). Congress established the FFIEC in 
1979 as an interagency body to prescribe uniform examination procedures, 
and to promote uniform supervision, among the federal agencies responsible 
for the examination and supervision of financial institutions. Id. In 1980, 
Congress gave the FFIEC responsibility for public access to HMDA data. See 
2006 HMDA Data, supra note 88 at 73.  
90 Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing, supra note 81, at 450 (response 
to questions submitted by Calvin R. Hagins). 
91 Id. at 42. 
92 The argument that the HMDA data do not prove discrimination cuts 
both ways. These data also do not exonerate lenders from discrimination. 
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Despite the advantages of including credit history 
information in HMDA data, limitations will continue to exist 
because the credit score is only one of many risk assessment 
variables lenders use to price loans. It must therefore be 
remembered that adding credit scores to HMDA data analyses 
will not transform these data into something other than the 
screening tool Congress envisioned. Yet the additional 
information will make the screening tool sharper in that it will 
be able to do a better job of identifying potential discrimination. 
This enhancement to federal oversight of the subprime market is 
appropriate given the concern that discriminatory practices are 
part of the foundation of the mortgage foreclosure crisis. Still, 
other concerns must be considered. 
1. Increased Lender Vulnerability to Litigation 
Credit score data would likely make some lenders vulnerable 
to fair lending lawsuits by individuals who believe that HMDA 
data, without more, conclusively identify discriminatory pricing. 
Even if lenders could successfully defend such lawsuits by 
providing additional credit risk or other explanations that 
sufficiently justify the pricing disparities, the expense of 
defending unsubstantiated claims can be costly.93 Additionally, 
the reputational harm that could result from accusations of racial 
discrimination may be difficult to repair. Another negative 
consequence for subprime lenders would be the cost of adjusting 
their systems for the reporting of the additional HMDA data. 
This cost is unknown and certainly must be considered, 
                                                          
However, credit score data would reduce the possibility that racial disparities 
reflect discriminatory treatment. Also, some legal scholars question whether 
credit scores are racially biased. See Chi Chi Wu, Credit Scoring and 
Insurance: Costing Consumers Billions and Perpetuating the Economic Racial 
Divide. 1–18 (2007), available at http://www.consumerlaw.org/reports/ 
content/InsuranceScoring.pdf.  
93 Engel & McCoy, supra note 84. Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy 
discussed the reporting of credit score information with a representative from 
the lending industry who implied that exposure to frivolous lawsuits was a 
downside to collection of these data. Id.  
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however, given the need for greater insight into the lending 
practices in the subprime market, this cost should not justify 
keeping credit score data from fair lending regulators at the time 
they receive the HMDA data.94 
2. Consumer Privacy 
Consumer privacy concerns are sometimes cited as a 
justification for omitting credit score information from HMDA 
data reporting requirements.95 Unfortunately, HMDA data can 
now be matched with other information (e.g., public records of 
property transfers) to determine the identity of individual 
borrowers. Adding credit score information to the HMDA data 
requirements could further compromise the privacy of borrowers 
because once the matching is done and the borrowers are 
identified, it would be possible to learn their credit scores. 
Obviously, consumers should not have to worry about their 
credit scores becoming publicly available because they applied 
for a mortgage loan. Given the validity of the privacy concern, 
it is difficult to argue that it is outweighed by the usefulness of 
the additional credit score data. This, however, should not end 
the discussion.  
Efforts should be made to address consumer privacy 
concerns in a manner that is consistent with requiring lenders to 
report credit score information. What is needed is a solution to 
the credit score reporting issue that does not compromise 
consumer privacy. According to two legal scholars, the United 
States Census Bureau has developed ways to protect privacy so 
that researchers can gain access to individual level census data 
without reporting a respondent’s identity.96 The FRB should 
examine these methods to see if they are suitable for 
safeguarding consumer privacy in the context of reporting credit 
                                                          
94 If credit score information is captured and analyzed with current 
HMDA data, banking regulators should be able to identify more expeditiously 
financial institutions with suspicious lending patterns. This approach may 
therefore reduce inefficiency in fair lending enforcement. 
95 See Gramlich, supra note 79. 
96 See supra note 84. 
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score data. Another approach that is ripe for exploration is for 
subprime lenders to report the credit score information to the 
FRB for its internal use only. The FRB analysts would crunch 
the data and initiate investigations if racial disparities persisted 
after taking credit histories into account.97 By restricting the data 
disclosure to the FRB only, public disclosure is avoided and 
consumer privacy is maintained. Additionally, both the Census 
Bureau approach and the FRB internal use approach would avoid 
exposing lenders to frivolous lawsuits.98  
The FRB should explore these or comparable privacy 
safeguards that would remove barriers to obtaining credit scores 
at the same time demographic and other HMDA data are 
obtained. Adding credit scores would promote greater 
transparency of the lending practices in the subprime mortgage 
market and in turn will likely increase ECOA compliance efforts 
of subprime lenders. The HMDA analyses that include credit 
scores will help explain to banking regulators whether any racial 
disparities are due to legitimate nondiscriminatory factors or to 
illegal discrimination.99 
3. Access to Credit: The Government’s Role 
A credit score reporting requirement might cause some 
subprime lenders to curtail the availability of credit to higher-
risk borrowers. The risk of bad public relations, litigation, and 
more regulatory scrutiny would undoubtedly influence these 
decisions. Yet racial minorities may be hurt if subprime lenders 
cut back on making loans, as would other ECOA group 
members who are protected by the fair lending laws.100 To be 
                                                          
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See Rooting Out Discrimination Hearing, supra note 81, at 89 
(prepared statement of Calvin R. Hagins). 
100 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Newly Collected Data and What it 
Means: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit of H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 138 (2006) 
(prepared statement of Professor Michael E. Staten, Director, Credit 
Research Center, McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University) 
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sure, subprime lending is an important element of our financial 
system because it provides a way for many people with 
blemished credit records, minority and non-minority, to become 
homeowners or obtain home financing who may otherwise be 
unable to do so.101 Given their defective credit histories, and 
perhaps other vulnerabilities, subprime borrowers have few 
financial options available and thus are more susceptible to 
predatory lending practices.102 Paradoxically, the question 
becomes whether the “access to credit” concern outweighs the 
benefit of having HMDA data that can more accurately identify 
possible ECOA violators. 
As discussed in Part I above, the legacy of redlining 
discrimination where traditional lenders have failed to serve 
minority communities is a contributing factor to the problem of 
predatory subprime lending and discrimination in these 
communities.103 Denying loans to minority borrowers at 
reasonable and fair rates creates voids that can be quickly filled 
by predatory lenders that charge exorbitant mortgage rates and 
fees. In essence, a large part of the problem for minority 
borrowers who turn to predatory subprime lenders is that in 
many minority neighborhoods there is very little, if any, 
competition for mortgage loans.104 These lenders sometimes use 
                                                          
[hereinafter HMDA New Data Hearing]. Professor Staten voices the concerns 
of Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Schmidt Bies about reducing 
mortgage credit availability for higher-risk borrowers in his testimony on the 
misuse of the HMDA pricing data. Id. 
101 See Mayer & Pence, supra note 6, at 3 (finding that subprime loans 
appear to provide credit in locations where credit might be more difficult to 
obtain); see also Christopher R. Childs, Comment, So You’ve Been 
Preempted—What Are You Going To Do Now?: Solutions for States 
Following Federal Preemption of State Predatory Lending Statutes, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 701, 709 (discussing what is predatory lending and why it is 
harmful). 
102 See Warren, supra note 17 (discussing the effects of predatory 
lending). 
103 See supra Part I.  
104 See Problems in Community Development, Banking, Mortgage 
Lending Discrimination, Reverse Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: 
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 
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abusive and discriminatory lending practices. But not all 
subprime lending is predatory or discriminatory, which means 
that all subprime borrowers are not victims.105 As Federal 
Reserve Governor Susan Schmidt Bies admonished, if expanded 
HMDA data requirements lead to the “unwarranted tarnishing of 
a lender’s reputation, this could reduce the willingness of that 
lender or another to remain in, or enter, certain higher-priced 
segments of the market.”106 Indeed, the possibility of cutting off 
some legitimate subprime mortgage credit sources of people with 
already limited credit options is something that must be carefully 
considered before expanding HMDA to include credit scores. 
On the other hand, adding credit score information to the 
HMDA reporting requirement of subprime lenders could help 
federal regulators better identify subprime lenders who use 
racially discriminatory lending practices. 
One way out of this conundrum is for the federal 
government to provide subprime borrowers with additional 
mortgage credit sources. This approach addresses the diminished 
credit problem and consequently removes this obstacle to 
allowing regulators to obtain credit score data that could better 
assist them in overseeing the subprime mortgage market. Along 
these lines, Professor Ronald Silverman has proposed an 
attractive idea that merits serious consideration. He suggests that 
Congress tackle the predatory lending problem by providing 
funding to credit unions for the purpose of making additional 
subprime mortgage loans.107 This proposal has several 
                                                          
103d Cong. 392 (1993) (written testimony of John B. Long and Thomas W. 
Tucker, Partners, Dye, Tucker, Everitt, Wheale & Long; and David E. 
Hudson, Partner, Hull, Towill, Norman & Barrett). 
105 The terms “subprime” and “predatory” lending are frequently and 
erroneously used interchangeably to refer to abusive and unscrupulous 
lending practices. While subprime loans certainly pose inherent financial 
risks, and lenders are susceptible to engaging in predatory practices, 
subprime loans are not inherently abusive or predatory but serve an 
appropriate function in the market. See Andre K. Gray, Comment, Caveat 
Emptor: Let the Borrower Beware of the Subprime Mortgage Market, 11 U. 
PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 195, 195 (2008). 
106 See HMDA New Data Hearing, supra note 100, at 138. 
107 Silverman, supra note 18, at 585–87.  
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advantages. First, it would provide competition to predatory 
subprime lenders, including those who use discriminatory 
lending practices. As a result, subprime minority borrowers will 
have alternative means of obtaining mortgage credit through 
legitimate sources. This would help to eliminate racial 
discrimination in the subprime market. Second, credit unions are 
regulated at the state or federal level and are subject to the 
ECOA’s anti-discrimination mandate. Consequently, the 
subprime lending that credit unions provide is already, and will 
continue to be, examined for fair lending compliance. Third, as 
non-profit depository institutions with a long history of 
providing financial services to people of modest means, credit 
unions are likely to imbue public trust.108 Finally, as Professor 
Silverman so aptly notes, “a supportive government presence 
need not involve the federal government as the lender of either 
first or last resort.”109 Thus, the federal government would not 
become a mortgage bank under the credit union funding 
approach. 
Congress should fully examine the idea of a government 
supported subprime mortgage loan alternative to predatory 
lenders. Buying a home is the most expensive purchase most 
consumers will ever make. Because of the substantial investment 
borrowers make when purchasing or refinancing a home, it is 
imperative that they enter mortgage transactions in an 
environment of trust and honesty. By providing funding to credit 
unions, Congress can assist minority borrowers in avoiding 
lenders that use abusive and racially discriminatory practices. At 
the same time, the FRB could move forward with requiring 
subprime lenders to report credit score data without jeopardizing 
home mortgage credit for subprime borrowers.  
 CONCLUSION 
Predatory lenders are destroying the reputation of legitimate 
subprime lenders who provide valuable mortgage services to 
                                                          
108 See id. at 582–585. 
109 Id. at 586. 
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various segments of the population that would otherwise be 
unable to afford or refinance a home. These predators bring to 
subprime lending not only abusive tactics but discriminatory 
practices as well—a combination that can wreak havoc on people 
and communities of color. As we continue to seek solutions to 
predatory lending, we should not forget the role that racial 
discrimination plays in the abusive subprime market. This 
persistent problem must be addressed if solutions for stopping 
the next subprime crisis are to be effective. Part of the solution 
at the federal level is to bolster enforcement of consumer 
protection laws. Accordingly, government attorneys should bring 
more enforcement actions against subprime lenders that engage 
in discrimination in violation of the ECOA. Additionally, the 
FRB should facilitate these litigation efforts by providing ECOA 
enforcement authorities with a better means of identifying 
predatory lenders that discriminate unlawfully. Requiring 
subprime lenders to report credit score data would be an 
invaluable tool in uncovering discriminatory conduct. Moreover, 
Congress can help solve this problem by changing the 
environment in which predatory lenders thrive, namely, in 
places where borrowers have few mortgage lending alternatives 
to unscrupulous home loan providers. By funding credit unions, 
the federal government can facilitate competition in the subprime 
market and thus provide viable mortgage funding options to 
vulnerable consumers. While growing calls for stopping 
predatory subprime mortgage lending are positive steps in the 
right direction, effective solutions must include holding subprime 
lenders liable and accountable for lending discrimination on the 
basis of race and other illegal factors.  
